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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-2(a)-3 based upon pourover by the supreme 
court. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether appellant is entitled constitutionally to greater 
notice than other parties after he has refused mail from opposing 
counsel, failed to stay in contact with the court and failed to 
keep the court notified of his current mailing address? 
Standard of Review: 
1. Constitutional questions are reviewed independently. See 
State v. Benson, 845 P.2d 254 (Utah 1992). 
2. Review of trial court's determination of law is usually 
characterized by term "correctness". State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1994). 
B. Whether the Fourth District Court properly exercised its 
discretion when it denied the appellant's motion for relief under 
Rule 60(b). 
Standard of Review: It is largely within the discretion of the 
trial court to set aside a judgement that has been ordered on 
a party's default and, while this discretion should be 
liberally exercised in favor of a defaulting party, the 
decision of the trial court will not be reversed on appeal in 
absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Pitman v. Bonham, 677 
P.2d 1126 (Utah 1984). 
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C. Whether the judgment maybe reaffirmed on any other 
grounds. 
Standard of review: 
Reviewing court will affirm a trial court's decision 
whenever it can do so on a proper ground, even though it 
is not the ground on which the trial court relied in it's 
ruling. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neelev Const. Co, 
677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Ut. 1984). 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
1. Utah Constitution Article 1 Section 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
2. Utah Code Annotated 78-13-4 
An action may properly be brought "in the county 
where such obligation is to be performed, the 
contract was signed, or in which the defendant 
resides." 
3. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Mistake; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time 
to move for a new trial under rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party, (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action 
has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by rule 4 (e) and the defendant has failed to 
appear in said action; (5) the judgement is void; (6) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or 
a prior judgment upon which is based has been revised or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any 
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other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceedings was 
entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules by an independent action. 
4. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) SETTING ASIDE 
DEFAULT. 
For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been 
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60 (b). 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arose out of the denial of appellant's Rule 60(b) 
Motion for Relief from judgment, which was filed over four(4) 
months after entry of judgment and six(6) months after trial in 
this matter. Appellant claims lack of due process in the 
proceedings before the trial court. 
B. PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITIONS 
This matter arose out of a real estate transaction between 
appellees and appellant wherein the appellant sold property with a 
well, which well created numerous health problems. (R. at 5-6) 
Appellant breached his contract and actively hid the home's 
numerous defects from appellees prior to closing. (R. at 4-5) The 
problems were hidden form the appellees until after closing, 
although they inspected the home and made an attempt to check on 
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the water quality while they were contemplating the purchase of the 
home. (Complaint See R. at 2) Plaintiffs were damaged by becoming 
sick through the water, loss of work time to repair numerous holes 
and other problems of which they were not aware contrary to 
contract, and repair of defects which were actively hidden from 
them by the defendant. (R. at 4-6) The sale was completed in April 
of 1994, and appellant immediately breached the agreement by 
failing to leave the home within the time specified in the addendum 
to the contract. (R. at 5) He further breached his extension 
agreement by failing to clean the home, leaving it in a shambles. 
(R. at 5) 
Beginning June 15, 1994, appellant was represented by D. Kevin 
Degraw of Waddingham and Peterson. (R. at 13) Appellant maintained 
the same counsel until August 29, 1995, when counsel filed a notice 
of withdrawal. (R. at 54) The notice of withdrawal gave the 
mailing address of appellant as a post office box in Logandale, 
Nevada, and a copy was sent to appellant. (R. at id) 
Following withdrawal of counsel, appellees filed Notice to 
Appear or Appoint (R. at 55), a request for pretrial filed October 
2, 1995 (R. at 56), Supplementation of Discovery filed November 3, 
1995 (R. at 61) and Request for Admissions filed December 26, 1995 
(R. at 63). The court sent two pretrial notices (R. at 60 and 65) 
and notice of non-jury trial to be held on February 15, 1996 on 
January 18, 1996, 28 days before trial (R. at 66). No other 
documents were sent until February 5, 1996 when a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support thereof, as well as 
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Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted were filed (R. at 70, 71 and 
80). The four documents mailed by appellees prior to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment were all returned from the Logandale, Nevada 
address stamped "REFUSED". (R. at 88, 89, 90 and 91) Neither the 
court nor counsel were ever informed of a mailing address in 
Windsor, Connecticut nor Hong Kong, nor was the court notified that 
the mail was delayed in reaching Mr. Turley until he filed his 
affidavit in regard to Motion for Relief from Judgment. (Cf R. at 
122 and 141) Appellant did not attend either of the telephonic 
pretrials (R. at 187) held in December of 1995 and January of 1996, 
and the only contact he had with the court prior to August 22, 
1996, was a telephonic message on February 13, 1996 requesting 
continuance. (Telephonic message not numbered as part of the 
record, and included in the brief of appellant) 
On February 15, 1996, appellees' admissions were deemed 
admitted (R. at 92), and this resolved all outstanding remaining 
questions of fact. (R. at 187) Judgment was subsequently entered 
for appellees April 18, 1996 (R. at 100), and notice of entry of 
judgment was filed May 6, 1996. (R. at 110) 
Following notice of entry of judgment, an ex parte order of 
attachment was issued July 30, 1996 for personal property belonging 
to appellant. (R. at 115) Following the issuance of the ex parte 
order, appellant filed his motion to set aside default judgment on 
August 22, 1996. (R. at 119) The court entered an order denying 
appellant's motion for relief from judgment December 9, 1996. (R. 
at 186) Final judgment having been entered, notice of appeal was 
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filed December 19, 1996. (R. at 200) 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case presents the court with a party to litigation who 
has voluntarily removed himself from the country to seek employment 
and voluntarily dismissed counsel, (R. at 122-128) leaving himself 
without an agent to act for him in the state, refuses to 
communicate with the opposing party, (R. at 88-91 ) refuses to 
acknowledge orders of the court, (R. at 187) and then seeks relief 
from judgment without time limit after. 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. Appellant had his answer stricken due to his failure to 
participate in the proceedings, default entered against him. After 
the Order of Judgment was entered against him, Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure controlled post judgment motions for relief. Rule 60(b) 
jurisprudence controls this appeal. 
B. Relief under Rule 60(b) is available only to those acting 
in good faith. Following the discharge of his attorney in August 
of 1995, and continuing until August 22, 1996, appellant's 
involvement in the action consisted of two acts: (1) the refusal of 
all mail sent by appellees to him through December of 1995; and (2) 
a lone phone call to the clerk of the court requesting continuance 
of trial two days hence. He otherwise ignored all mail sent by the 
court and appellees. He did return to the United States in early 
July of 1996, in time to have filed a timely Rule 60(b) motion, but 
took no action until after execution on his personal property had 
begun. This lack of interest is bad faith, and will not support 
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Rule 60(b) relief. 
C. Appellant has made a number of claims for relief, both 
below, and in this appeal. He makes no claim under Rule 60(b)(2), 
new evidence, 60(b)(3) fraud or misconduct, or 60(b)(6) 
satisfaction of judgment. He was properly served and entered a 
general appearance, preventing a 60(b)(4) claim, and because the 
parties were residents of Millard County, the acts complained of 
occurred there, the real property was located there and the 
contracts executed there, the trial court, being of general 
jurisdiction had jurisdiction and venue was proper. The grounds 
for relief under Rule 60(b) most similar to his claim is that of 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, 60(b)(1). 
Appellant, being pro se, does have a superficial claim for 
indulgence from the trial court due to his unfamiliarity with 
procedure and rules of the court. However, when a pro se party 
refuses communications from the opposing party, does not contact 
the court for long periods of time, makes himself unavailable to 
the court for pretrial or other hearings, and does not contact the 
court once he returns to the United States, that is indifference, 
and not excusable or a mistake. 
Finally, Rule 60(b) relief is time barred. Time expired 
pursuant to the Rule on July 18, 1996 for claims under 60(b)(1)-
(4). A reasonable time is allowed for claims under 60(b)(5)-(7). 
Due to the indifference of appellant, and the lack of contact with 
either the court or appellees for six months, the court ruled that 
three (3) months was reasonable, and had expired. 
7 
D. Appellant made a claim under 60(b)(7) for due process. 
Due process is a matter of balancing the needs of the party with 
the community based upon what is fair and decent, neither ignoring 
the individual's needs, nor overburdening the court or opposing 
parties. In this matter, appellant voluntarily made himself 
scarce, and now complains that, although he provided no means of 
speedy reliable communication, the appellees should bare the burden 
for late notice of trial. When considered compounded on the fact 
that he made no effort to attend any pretrial conference, and 
refused communications with appellees, it would be unfair to 
provide this special treatment to appellant. 
E. Although relief was sought and denied under Rule 60(b), 
this court may reaffirm the judgment on any other grounds. The 
trial court resolved all remaining issues of fact at trial by 
deeming the Requests for Admissions admitted. Remand would serve no 
purpose. Alternatively, because this is a 60(b)(1) claim, relief 
can be denied as time barred. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. RULE 60(B) CONTROLS THE AVAILABILITY OF RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT HEREIN. 
The trial court, by its minute entry of February 15, 1996 
(R. at 94), and order of judgment entered April 18, 1996 (R. at 
110), deemed admissions admitted, struck the answer of the 
appellant and entered default judgment. Rule 55 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure controls default judgments and provides as 
follows: 
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For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been 
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b). (underline added) , 
Judgment has been entered in this matter. (R. at 100) In 
addition, Rule 58(A)(d) requires notice of entry of judgment, with 
notice of service on the opposing party. That notice was given and 
filed May 6, 1996. (R. at 110) Pursuant to the rules, a default 
judgment has been entered and notice given of entry pursuant to the 
rule by the appellees. Rule 60(b) therefore controls the motion to 
set aside the judgment. ' 
B. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH. 
Relief from judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
is predicated upon a basic showing of good faith. See Chrysler v. 
Chrysler, 5 Ut.2d 415, 303 P.2d 995 (1956). The Rule itself 
provides in material part that the relief is to be "upon such terms 
as are just" and that it should be "in the furtherance of justice". 
Although this is admitted by the appellant in his brief, he then 
minimizes the discretion of the Trial Court, assumes good faith and 
presumes that relief will further justice. In Pitman v. Bonham, 
677 P.2d 1126 (ut. 1984) the court held as follows: 
It is largely within the discretion of the Trial 
Court to set aside judgment which has been entered on a 
party's default and, while this discretion should be 
liberally exercised in favor of the defaulting party, the 
decision of the trial court will not be reversed on 
appeal in absence of a clear abuse of discretion Pitman 
v. Bonham, 677 P.2d 1126 (Ut. 1984). 
The Trial Court did exercise its discretion after 
reviewing the behavior of appellant and the record and the 
appellant court must respect that discretion absent abuse. 
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Paragraph eight of the Order denying relief provides as follows, 
and gives as good a description of bad faith to support 
discretionary denial of relief as one might ask for: 
On April 18, 1996 this Court's Order of Judgment was 
filed. In its Order, the Court noted the following: the 
Defendant refused the Plaintiffs' discovery request; 
Defendant failed to appear, either in person or 
telephonically, at both scheduled pre trial conferences; 
the plaintiffs' Request for Admissions dealt with 
remaining issues of fact in the matter, and Defendant did 
not timely respond to those requests; and Defendant 
failed to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Therefore, based on Defendant's failure to 
comply and cooperate with discovery, as well as a failure 
to appear at either scheduled pretrial conferences or the 
non-jury trial, this court entered a default judgment. 
(R. at 187-188) 
Appellant's counsel withdrew, pursuant to defendant's request, 
on August 29, 1995 (R. at 54). Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration requires opposing counsel to send Notice to Appear 
or Appoint, and bars all activity for twenty (20) days. There 
after this notice was filed September 5, 1995, (R. at 55) and no 
further action undertaken until the Request Pretrial filed October 
2, 1995, twenty-seven days later. (R. at 56) 
Appellant not only failed to appear or respond, from September 
1995 though January 1996 he returned the mail from appellees 
"Refused". (R. at 188-1991) Appellant also failed to contact the 
trial court for either pretrial, but he did attempt to have the 
trial continued without any indication as to when an appropriate 
time would be. If his intentional refusal to cooperate is any 
indication as to when trial could go forward, it is likely that no 
trial would ever be held. 
Appellant next showed his complete disinterest in the 
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proceedings by failing to contact the court from February 13, 1996 
until after execution had begun, although he was back in the United 
States for about a month prior to execution and with three months 
of entry of judgment. (R. at 115 and 141) During this six month 
period of no contact, the order was entered, (R. at 100) Notice of 
Entry of Judgment was sent to him, (R. at 111) and appellees went 
forward to collect on their judgment by initiating a writ of 
attachment on the personal property of the appellant. (R. at 115) 
What seemed to be apparent to the trial court in its order, as 
well as to the appellees now, is that appellant had no interest in 
whether the judgment was entered or not until there was a 
possibility of collecting from him. He apparently believed that 
there was no possibility in collecting from him while he was in 
China, and so did not need to protect his interests until August of 
1996 when execution began. Appellant admits that he was in the 
United States for a month and a half prior to filing his motion 
before he did anything. (R. at 141) This does not sound like an 
individual who was acting in good faith or was at all concerned 
about the proceeding to which he was a party. No relief should be 
granted under provisions of Rule 60(b) to appellant. 
C. NO RELIEF Is AVAILABLE UNDER RULE 60(B)(1)-(6). 
Rule 60(b) provides in material part as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
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intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party, (4) when, for any cause, 
the summons in an action has not been personally served 
upon the defendant as required by rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgement is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which 
is based has been revised or otherwise vacated, or it is 
no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months 
after the judgment, order, or proceedings was entered or 
taken. 
Appellant is making confusing claims which touch on most of 
the Rule 60(b) subdivisions. As a result, appellees will address 
each subdivision in turn. 
1. Appellant alleges excusable neglect or mistake, but should not 
be granted relief under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Appellant is alleging that he should be relieved from what is 
essentially a mistake that has, through inadvertence or excusable 
neglect, kept him from successfully defending in this matter. The 
mistakes are the inability to receive mail in a timely fashion or 
at all while he was out of the country after he fired his attorney. 
This argument ignores: (1) appellants failure to keep the court 
informed of his actual address and correct mailing address (R. at 
188-191 and 141); (2) his refusal to cooperate with discovery (R. 
at 188-191); and (3) failure to make any attempt to participate in 
pretrial conferences or schedule a make up time with counsel or the 
court (R. at 187-188). Appellant claims he should have been 
informed of his duties and liabilities by the court as a pro-se 
defendant, but fails to say just how or when this could have 
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happened when he made no attempt to stay in communication with 
anyone. Appellant essentially states he should he relieved from 
judgment because, as a pro se defendant, he did not know he needed 
to pay attention to the court's notices or correspondence from the 
opposing parties, and thus everything he did was excusable error 
because he was pro-se. 
The Federal Courts, ruling on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b) upon which Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure of 
is based, have interpreted Federal Rule 60(b) as requiring the 
establishment of a legal ground before relief from a judgment may 
I 
be granted, and when such a ground does not exist ffit would be an 
abuse of discretion to open judgment". See Western Union Tele. 
Company v. Dismenq, 106 F.2d 362 (10th Cir 1939). And in Greater 
Baton Rouge Golf Association v. Recreation & Park Comm'n for Parish 
of East Baton Rouge, 507 F.2d 227 (5th Cir 1975), the court stated 
that Rule 60(b) was designed to provide relief from "technical 
error". The "technical errors" which appellant present to the 
court as the basis for relief are essentially his refusal to 
cooperate with opposing counsel, failure to make any appearance and 
lack of effort to remain abreast of actions in the trial court. 
The record is extremely informative as to the interest expressed by 
appellant in this matter until his property was going to be seized 
through the writ of attachment issued July 30, 1995 (R. at 115). 
That is, there was none. 
3fn Interstate Excavating Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 611 
P. 2d 369 (Utah 1980), a case similar to this one in one respect, 
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and cited by appellant, the counsel for defendant withdraw at 
pretrial. However, appellant herein unlike the Interstate 
defendant in that the Interstate defendant claimed to have received 
no notice to appoint counsel, and no notice of trial until a 
default was entered, which Mr. Turley did have here. Setting aside 
a default was appropriate in that case. See also Sperry v. Smith, 
694 P. 2d 5801 (Utah 1984). A case more on point, though, is Russel 
v. Martellf 681 P. 2d 1193 (Utah 1984), wherein appellant failed for 
a long period to do anything, default was proper and relief denied 
because of the demonstrated indifference of appellant in pursuing 
his opportunity to defend. One phone call between withdrawal of 
counsel on September 29, 1995 (R. at 54) and Motion to Set Aside 
filed August 22, 1996 (R. at 119) looks very much like indifference 
for a long time. Because the basis for relief, although couched in 
terms of "due process", is in reality one of excusable neglect or 
mistake, and the neglect is in fact indifference, no relief may be 
granted. 
2. No relief has been sought under 60(b)(2), 60(b)(3) nor 
60(b)(6). 
Appellant has not alleged 60(b)(3) fraud, either extrinsic 
intrinsic, misrepresentation or misconduct by the appellees or 
their counsel as a basis for relief (See R. at 122 and 151). 
Neither is there an allegation of newly discovered evidence having 
an impact on this matter under 60(b)(2). (See R. at id) The 
appellant is also not claiming to have satisfied discharge to his 
debt under the judgment under rule 60(b)(6). (Cf R. at id) 
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3. There is no relief available under Rule 60(b)(4) 
The appellant was properly served and a return was filed with 
the court June 15, 1994 (R. at 20) and a personal appearance was 
made by answer (R. at 13). There may be no relief under 60(b)(4) 
inasmuch as personal service was had and appellant entered a 
general appearance through his answer. 
4. No relief is available Under Rule 60(b)(5) 
Pursuant to the complaint, (R. at 1) and not disputed in the 
answer (R. at 14), this matter dealt with breach of contract and 
real property located in Millard County, where the trial court. 
Under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-13-4, an action may properly 
be brought "in the county where such obligation is to be performed, 
the contract was signed, or in which the defendant resides." 
Appellees allege that all parties are or were residents of Millard 
County, and the real property is located in Millard County, in 
Delta, Utah. (R. at 1 ) Appellant admitted these were true (R. at 
I 
14). A special addendum was signed at the time of closing with 
regard to the property in Millard County (R. at 4), and appellant 
admitted execution of the document at the time of closing in 
Millard County (R. at 16). 
In appellants Motion for Relief, he claimed that the judgment 
was void as an alternative claim for relief. However, inasmuch as 
the contract was executed, the real property is located, the 
actions complained of occurred and the parties all resided in 
Millard County, venue and jurisdiction were a proper with the trial 
court. No relief may be granted under 60(b)(5). 
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5. Rule 60(b) relief is time barred 
The trial court also ruled the Motion time barred. If 
subsection (1) is the proper grounds for relief, relief may not be 
granted. More than three months have passed from the Order of 
Judgment on April 18, 1996 (R. at 100), until the Motion for Relief 
was filed August 22, 1996. (R. at 120) See Laub v. South Central 
Utah Telephone Assoc. Inc., 657 P.2d (Utah 1982). Rule 60(b) 
provides three months for bringing a motion for relief under 
subsections (1)-(4). Because the claim is one of essentially 
excusable neglect, no review should be necessary, it being barred 
by the rule. 
The trial court also found the alleged 60(b)(7) (discussed 
below) claim time barred. This was based upon the claim that mail 
through Logandale took 25 days to reach appellant, and he did 
nothing from when judgment was entered from May 11, 1996,(twenty-
five days after April 18, 1996) the day notice of judgment should 
have reached him until August 22, 1996. During this time, he was 
back in the United States (R. at 141) within three (3) months of 
entry of the Order, and did what he had done since August 29, 1995, 
nothing. The rule calls for a "reasonable time", reasonable being 
discretionary with the trial court and highly fact specific. 
Here, three months was "reasonable", since no action occurred, 
although appellant had opportunity, until execution began, and he 
showed no interest at all until that time. 
D. NO BASIS FOR RELIEF EXISTS UNDER RULE 60(b)(7). 
Appellant's final attempt is to make a claim under Rule 
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60(b)(7) for "any other reason justifying relief". Upon review of 
the claim, the argument seems to boil down a claim by appellant 
that it took a long time, twenty-six days, for mail to reach him in 
China when it was routed through the Logandale, Nevada address 
(which his former counsel gave to the court and opposing counsel at 
the time of withdrawal (R. at 54)), then through the Connecticut 
address to Hong Kong, (an address which is still not disclosed), 
and finally hand carried to him in China, which long time prevented 
him from effectively defending himself. Alternatively, he claims 
that because mail service to him was so uncertain, he not having 
received most of the court notices or mail from counsel, (something 
not capable of corroboration or disproof) it is unfair for him to 
be held responsible for any mail sent to him at all. Before 
examining the arguments that due process requires inquiry and 
accommodation of his voluntary inaccessibility, a review of what 
constitutes due process is necessary. 
The right to due process is enshrined in the Utah Constitution 
in Article I, section 7, which is based upon the United States 
Constitutional due process guarantees found in the Vth and XlVth 
Amendments. In Galvan V. Press, 74 S.Ct 737, 347 U.S. 522, 98 
L.Ed. 911 (1954), rehearing denied 75 S.Ct 17, 348 U.S. 852, 99 L. 
Ed. 671, the court held that "Fair play is the essence of 'due 
process'". 
In Breithauot v. Abram, 77 S.Ct. 408, 352 U.S. 432, 1 L.Ed.2d 
448 (1957) the court further explained that: 
Furthermore, due process is not measured by the yard 
stick of the personal reaction or the sphygmogram of the 
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most sensitive person, but by the whole community sense 
of "decency and fairness" that has been woven by common 
experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct. 
Breithaupt, 77 S.Ct. at 410, 352 U.S.at 436. 
What, then, is the "decent and fair" thing to do in regard to 
notice? 
Should due process notice be a matter of individual inquiry in 
every case, and should the court and opposing parties be put on a 
constitutional quest to find a guaranteed method of service to 
parties, or is due process a matter of notice reasonably calculated 
to inform while not imposing an undue burden on the court or 
opposing parties? First, it should be noted that a method is 
available for relief due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable 
neglect (the actual situation complained of with slow mail 
service), and that is to bring a motion for relief under Rule 
60(b)(1) within three (3) months of entry of judgment. Appellant 
was back in the United States in early July 1996 (R. at 141), which 
was within three months of the entry of judgment on April 18, 1997. 
(R. at 100) Between February 15, 1996 and July, 18,1997, he could 
have called a friend or relative to check on the status of this 
case, he could have sent a request to the court for information 
regarding what had happened, he could have telephoned the court, 
which he has shown the court that he could do,(unnumbered telephone 
message) or he could have written to opposing counsel. He did none 
of these four things. He sat on his rights for six months. 
In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), the 
defendant filed a timely motion for new Lrial which was denied. 
His appeal was granted on the basis that "timely and adequate 
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notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the 
very heart of procedural fairness." Nelson, 699 P.2d at 1211. The 
facts are that Mr. Nelson had his complaint dismissed, and then 
reinstated at a hearing. A further hearing for one week later was 
set. Notice did not arrive at the defendant's address until two 
days before trial at which time he learned the "hearing" was the 
trial. The only similarity between this action and Nelson, is the 
arrival of notice about two days before trial. Mr. Jacobsen, gave 
attention to the proceedings, and the unfair burden, of notice 
arriving two days before trial, was neither "decent" nor "fair". 
Relief timely requested should have been granted therein. Mr. 
Turley, appellant herein, is not Mr. Jacobsen. 
Appellant herein evidenced by the content of his message, 
which he left with the court clerk on February 13, 1996, that he 
understood that February 15, 1996 would be a trial. He was 
therefore "adequately informed... of the specific issues." He knew 
pretrials were being held in December of 1995 and January of 1996. 
(R. at 60 and 65) Nelson v. Jacobsen, 699 P.2d at 1213. Whether, 
as in Breithaupt, we look to the community's view of "decency or 
fairness", or Nelson1s "basic fairness", each looks at all of the 
facts, not just the one most sensitive person. In Nelson , 
Jacobsen: (1) was involved in all pretrial activities; (2) attended 
the hearings; and (3) read his mail. Here, Mr. Turley: (1) refused 
to correspond with opposing parties (R. at 88-91); (2) failed to 
contact the court in any pretrial were the trial date was set (R. 
at 182); (3) did not inform the court of his current address; and 
1f 
(4) did nothing for most of one year, to include bring a timely 
motion. Nelson states that M'due process' is not a technical 
concept that can be reduced to a formula with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Rather, 'the demands 
of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure 
demand a procedure appropriate to the case just to the parties 
involved'" Nelson, 699 P. 2d at id quoting Rupp v. Grantsville City, 
610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980). It was without doubt a burden to 
receive his mail delayed to his employment site in China. However, 
what is fair or decent in allowing appellant to take no steps on 
his own behalf to mitigate the time delay or notify the court that 
it exists and then setting aside appellee's judgment? Appellant 
went well beyond excusable neglect in this indifference and lack of 
good common sense. He instructed his agent in Nevada to refuse 
letters sent by opposing counsel to the only address which had been 
provided instead of sending them on. He also failed to not act in 
a circumspect or timely manner, as opposed to Mr. Jacobson, and 
allowed more than six months to elapse after a call to avoid trial 
before he became concerned again with the case, and then only 
because execution commenced. 
It is further interesting to note that his statements in 
regard to his failure to receive mail all fall under the category 
of self-serving. It is quite amazing to appellees that appellant 
did not receive: (1) notice of withdrawal of his own counsel (R. at 
54); (2) notice to appear or appoint (R. at 55); (3) notice of 
hearing dates sent out by the court (R. at 59); (4) notice of 
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setting pre-trial in Provo (sent by court) October 27, 1995 (R. at 
60), or (5) notice of hearing (sent by court). (R. at 65) He also 
states, by affidavit, that he never received the motion for summary 
judgment although it was not returned marked refused, which was 
filed February 5, 1996 (R. at 70), the order deeming admissions 
admitted (sent by the court), (R. at 92) filed February 15, 1996, 
the affidavit of attorneys fees, (R. at 116) the Minute Entry for 
February 15, 1996, (R. at 94) or any of the other documents sent 
while he was out of the United States. The sole exception is the 
notice of non-jury trial, although all of the above were sent more 
than 26 days before he returned in July of 1996. While the above 
is possible barely, the responsibility for receiving mail by Mr. 
Turley sent through the post office, and being acted upon properly, 
should be that of Mr. Turley once he has been properly served. His 
motion seems propose that opposing counsel, and the court, insure 
that every mailing is received, not simply properly mailed, but 
gives no suggestions as to how to accomplish this without personal 
service every time. Parties could then hide or give a false 
address or addresses, which, as here, substantially delay delivery 
of mail, deny justice to the opposing parties, increase costs and 
interfere with the administration of justice. 
It is ridiculous and offensive to think that due process can 
be twisted to allow a party, who at best is indifferent to the 
proceedings, the opportunity for endless delay and frivolous 
appeal, as exists herein. 
With regard to the U.S. Supreme Court case and Utah Supreme 
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Court case which were relied by the appellant regarding notice, 
both Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed.2d 865 (1950), and Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 
851 (Utah 1981), deal with adequacy of notice of an impending 
action through service of process. Basically, this is a Rule 
60(b)(4) matter. Neither case has anything to do with post 
service-of-process notice as in this matter, and are easily 
distinguished in that dealt with individuals not parties to an 
action, and not notice after a party has been properly and 
personally served. Workman v. Naqle Const., Co.,802 P.2d 749 (Utah 
App. 1990), is likewise distinguishable in that it dealt with 
voiding a judgment where there was no notice to members of the 
class of individuals who were disadvantaged by the judgment. 
Again, there is no doubt that Mr. Turley had personal notice, made 
appearance, and then chose to become indifferent to results. No 
relief under 60(b)(7) should be granted. 
E. THE COURT MAY AFFIRM ON OTHER GROUNDS THE DECISION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT 
The trial court noted in its Order Denying Relief that all 
factual issues were resolved by the admissions being deemed 
admitted (R. at 176). Appellant did not identify this finding of 
facts as incorrect, it is not in dispute. In Bill Nay & Sons 
Excavating v. Neelev Const. Co, 677 P.2d 1120 (Ut. 1984) the court 
held that: 
Reviewing court will affirm a trial court's decision 
whenever it can do so on a proper ground, even though it 
is not the ground on which the trial court relied in it's 
ruling. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neelev Const. Co, 
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677 P.2d at 1121 (Ut. 1984). 
In as much as there are no remaining factual issues, judgment 
is proper for appellees even without default. The court may 
affirm solely on the basis that there will be no issue for trial on 
remand. 
The court may also find the matter time barred, it being 
properly a Rule 60(b)(1) issue, or time barred under Rule 60(b)(7), 
a reasonable time having elapsed prior to filing of the Motion for 
Relief. 
CONCLUSION 
It is appropriate for this court to deny the appeal in this 
matter, there being no valid claim under Rule 60(b)(7) of due 
process violation, and the time having run on both Rule 60(b)(1) 
and 60(b)(7) claims prior to the filing of this motion. 
Alternatively, all factual issues have been resolved in favor of 
appellees, and there would no issues remaining unresolved on 
remand. 
A3 Dated this /-^ day of ^t<^e> , 1997 
Richard C. Coxson 
Attorney for Appellees, 
Edward L. and Brenda DeWolf 
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